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1966] NEW YORK PRACTICE COVERAGE 303
through contribution from Rohde's estate, the difference between
two-thirds and one-half of the judgment.
In reversing the special term and granting the motion, the
appellate division, second department, following the case of Wold
v. Grozalsky,11  held that CPLR 1401 did not contemplate a
strictly mathematical computation of liability for payment between
joint tort-feasors.1 4  "Rather . . . the whole pattern of litigation
out of which the judgment was rendered is considered and the rela-
tive duties of the tort-feasors toward the injured party are assessed.
The process is essentially equitable and not mathematical." "5
The court stated that, for purposes of contribution, there were
two distinct causes (one active and one passive) of the plaintiff's
injuries, and, therefore, payment should be apportioned "not per
capita but per stirpes." 'l' The court consolidated the liability of
Grupenel and Queens Park as one such cause since both had failed
to perform identical duties arising from different sources, i.e., their
respective obligations as landlord and owner. In addition to this
similarity of duties, the court noted that Grupenel and Queens
Park were subsidiaries of the same parent, and were represented
by the same employees and by the same attorneys. "Their interests
and their positions were for all purposes the same. Except for
reasons of corporate convenience, either could have executed the
functions of the other." "
ARTICLE 31 - DlscLosURn
CPLR 3101(a): Disclosure extends to all relevant information
calculated to lead to relevant evidence.
Prior to Beyer v. Keller,""' in order for materials to be
the subject of an order for discovery and inspection, they had
to be "evidence in chief," viz., admissible at trial."59 Beyer, how-
ever, did away with this "evidence in chief" requirement.
With the adoption of Article 31 of the CPLR, it was felt that
pretrial discovery practices would be liberalized and that more
material would be made available to both parties. With the deci-
.13 277 N.Y. 364, 14 N.E.2d 437 (1939).
114 Id. at 366-67, 14 N.E.2d at 438.
-15 McCabe v. Century Theatres, Inc., 25 App. Div. 2d 154, 156, 268
N.Y.S.2d 48, 50 (2d Dep't 1966).
116 Supra note 115, at 158, 268 N.Y.S.2d at 52.
117 Ibid.
1158 11 App. Div. 2d 426, 207 N.Y.S2d 591 (1st Dep't 1960).
110 "Documents are not subject to inspection for the mere reason that
they will be useful in supplying a clue whereby evidence can be gathered.
Documents to be subject to inspection must be evidence themselves." People
ex rel. Lemon v. Supreme Court, 245 N.Y. 24, 29, 156 N.E. 84, 85 (1927).
See also Peters v. Marquez, 21 Misc. 2d 720, 196 N.Y.S.2d 840 (Sup. Ct.
Westchester County 1959) and cases cited therein.
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sion of the first department in Rios v. Donovan,20 many believed
that a liberal trend had been set when the court stated that:
The disclosure provisions of article 31 of the Civil Practice Law and
Rules were intended to enlarge the permissible use of pretrial pro-
cedure. The purpose of disclosure procedures is to advance the func-
tion of a trial to ascertain truth and to accelerate the disposition of suits.
Apart from the express provision of Civil Practice Law and Rules 104
that the Civil Practice Law and Rules 'shall be liberally construed to
secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every civiljudicial proceeding,' the courts would in any event construe the new
statute broadly to effectuate its purpose.121
However, CPLR 3101(a) has retained the phraseology of CPA
§ 288 and, thus, confusion has arisen.122 A recent lower court case,
West v,. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,' 2' is helpful in eliminating this
confusion.
In West, the plaintiff, by notice, sought an examination of all
books, papers and records relating to the funeral expenses of any-
one insured by the defendant. In denying the defendant's motion
for a protective order,12 4 the court stated:
CPLR 3101 provides that there shall be full disclosure of all evidence,
material and necessary in the prosecution of an action. . . . The word
'evidence' as used in the statute has not been held equivalent to that
evidence which might be admissible upon the trial of the action. Dis-
closure extends to alt relevant information calculated to lead to relevant
evidence. . . . If the information is sought in good faith for possible
use as evidence in chief or in rebuttal or for cross-examination, it
should be considered material and necessary . 125
Thus, it appears that in using the phrase "all relevant information
calculated to lead to relevant evidence," the court is adopting the
approach long used in the federal courts. 26
It is submitted that if this line of reasoning is adopted by
other New York courts, the liberal disclosure practice intended
by the drafters will become a reality.
12021 App. Div. 2d 409, 250 N.Y.S.2d 818 (1st Dep't 1964).
'121 1d. at 411, 250 N.Y.S.2d at 820.
1223 WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, NEW YoRx CiviL PRAcTcIcE 13101.07(1965).
12349 Misc. 2d 28, 266 N.Y.S.2d 600 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County
1965).
124CPLR 3103.
125 West v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 49 Misc. 2d 28, 29, 266 N.Y.S.2d 600,
602-03 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1965). (Emphasis added.)
12 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) provides that examination may include any
matter "which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending
action." Furthermore, the fact that such evidence is inadmissible at trial is
not grounds for an objection if the evidence sought appears to be reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
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